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It was only last January when hundreds of workers, their 
families and their neighbors turned out for the victory party in 
Prairieville, Louisiana. Located two miles from the sprawling 
petrochemical complexes on the old Geismar plantation along the 
Mississippi River, the party had all the trappings of those wonder-
ful Bayou shindigs. Someone had even baked a huge homemade 
cake and arranged for live fiddle music. 
The celebrants had a lot to rejoice about. In a David-and-Goliath 
battle which had lasted nearly six years, these strong-willed par-
tisans successfully forced their employer, West German chemical 
giant BASF, to end the longest lockout in U.S. history. 
Those who attended the victory celebration had every reason 
to be exuberant, but the memory of the tremendous suffering 
inflicted by BASF still lingered in their minds. Who could forget 
the suicides, the home foreclosures, the poverty and broken 
families that littered the wake of BASF's attempt to bust the 
workers' union, OCAW Local 4-620. Local 4-620 Committeeman 
Leslie Vann termed it a "hollow victory." "To say that it was a 
• Richard Leonard, who is OCAW's Special Projects Director, directed the "cor-
porate accountability campaign" against BASF. Zack Nauth was a reporter for 
the New Orleans Times-Picayune and is now executive director of the Louisiana 
Citizens for Tax Justice. 
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victory would be making light of the sacrifices of those who suf-
fered devastating personal and financial losses/' he said. 
Still, whatever you call it, OCAW 4-620 had, "with a little help 
from its friends," backed down a $25-billion-a-year multinational 
corporation that has devoted considerable time, money and energy 
to operating union-free in the United States. 
What started as a labor dispute involving 370 workers in rural 
Louisiana ended after the OCAW had transformed the struggle 
into a worldwide labor-environmental coalition against the policies 
and practices of BASF everywhere. In the process both the workers 
and the communities along the Mississippi River that make up 
"chemical alley" (93 chemical plants from Baton Rouge to New 
Orleans) learned a lot about cancer and other devastating diseases 
and their links to the operating procedures of BASF and other 
chemical companies. 
Today with most of the locked-out workers back at work at 
BASF's Geismar plant, the OCAW, in cooperation with the National 
Toxics Campaign, continues to be a leading force in the coalitions 
they helped form in battling BASF—among them, Louisiana 
Workers Against Toxic Chemical Hazards (LA WATCH), Ascension 
Parish Residents Against Toxic Pollution, and the , Louisiana 
Citizens for Tax Justice. 
This article tells the story of OCAW 4-620's struggle and of how 
the union won by expanding the number of people and the arenas 
in which BASF had to fight. 
The Labor Dispute 
BASF is the second largest chemical company in the world, with 
130,000 employees in Europe, the U.S., South America, Asia and 
Africa. At the time that BASF went after OCAW 4-620, it was in 
the midst of a highly successful labor purge at many of its U.S. 
locations, reducing the number of OCAW members working under 
contract from 2,000 in 1979 to 200 in 1985. 
BASF had eliminated unions at its plants in Wyandotte, 
Michigan; Holland, Michigan; and South Brunswick, New Jersey. 
At other places such as the BASF plants in Rensselaer, New York, 
and Huntington, West Virginia, the unions were bludgeoned into 
accepting contracts loaded with management rights clauses and 
stripped of provisions necessary for the union to effectively police 
the contract. At Huntington, this was the result of an 8-month 
lockout. 
The Geismar local was one of the last unions to be challenged 
by BASF. This was understandable as the group was 100% union— 
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remarkable in a right-to-work state like Louisiana. In early 1983, 
the company posted notices announcing that a petition to disavow 
the union was being circulated and that signing it would be a ' 'wise 
choice." But, as far as it was ever determined, not a single person 
signed the petition. 
In July of '83, one day after the election of Esnard Gremillion 
as the local's Group Chairman, BASF suddenly determined that 
the contractually provided payment of lost time for in-plant union 
business was in violation of federal law. Gremillion was told to 
remove his desk, chair, filing cabinet and phone from the 10-by-10 
shack that had been provided for the union at the plant. 
Then, in 1984 contract negotiations, BASF demanded a one-year 
wage freeze, a reduction in health care benefits, and changes in 
seniority rules that would have resulted in layoff for workers with 
as many as 24 years' service. For the union, the issue was not pay, 
but job security and some control over the work environment. 
The union rejected the company's final offer. BASF responded by 
locking out the union workers and replacing them with outside 
contractors. 
It was not a good time to be locked out. Louisiana had one of 
the highest unemployment rates in the nation, and thousands were 
hungry for any kind of work. The Reagan-era's pro-business 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), backed by the federal 
courts, consistently ruled against unions and eventually rejected 
all 50 charges filed by the OCAW during the lockout. 
The workers knew they were in for the long haul when BASF 
began loading up the bargaining table with even more onerous 
demands. At first, the company indicated its intention to subcon-
tract all maintenance work. This was followed by a proposal to 
subcontract 53 operator jobs and a demand to subcontract any 
or all remaining jobs at any time for any reason. 
As the lockout wore on, the hardships were intense, too intense 
for some. One locked-out worker turned a pistol on himself. Others 
saw their boats, cars and houses repossessed, and some marriages 
and families fell apart under the strain. There were separations 
when some went elsewhere to find work, and bankruptcies when 
no jobs were found. A few of the poorer workers tried unsuccess-
fully to negotiate separately with the company, undercutting the 
union's position, but the vast majority of the union held together 
through thick and thin. 
The bonds between them were not broken even in October 1987 
when, after three years of the lockout, BASF ordered 260 operators 
to return or be terminated, fired 110 maintenance workers, and 
declared the lockout ' 'over.'' The operators returned to work under 
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terms imposed by management, but they refused to sign any labor 
agreement; many of the recalled operators were ready to sign, but 
not if it meant abandoning the maintenance workers. While some 
of the maintenance workers were ready to take the severance pay 
BASF offered if they accepted their firing, the majority wanted 
their jobs, not a payoff. 
The workers held together again when the NLRB refused to 
challenge BASF's unilateral action, the first time in 49 years that 
a company had been allowed to permanently replace locked-out 
workers. Again, the company dangled severance packages of as 
much as $29,000 to some workers, and once again not a single 
worker stood in support of taking a vote on the company's final 
offer. BASF's attempt to divide the local or crush the maintenance 
workers was a miserable failure. 
One year into the lockout, the OCAW initiated a "corporate 
accountability campaign" with the intention of causing trouble 
for BASF anywhere and anytime it could. This campaign and the 
coalitions it spawned changed the rules of the game, and even-
tually brought the company back to the table on the union's terms. 
But without the incredible solidarity of 4-620's leadership and 
rank-and-file, nothing else would have been possible. 
In December 1989 a settlement was reached when BASF offered 
to take back all the locked-out workers, maintain the seniority 
system, and not subcontract their jobs. While many workers were 
still bitter, the contract was approved 7-to-l because the union's 
basic demands had been met. The contract granted an immediate 
8% wage increase for returning workers and increases of 3.5% 
a year in 1990 and 1991. All health insurance cost increases during 
the first two years and 80% of those in the third year will be paid 
by the company. Workers also received seniority credit for their 
locked-out years for all purposes except pensions. 
How Did They Do It? 
As the lockout stretched towards its first anniversary, it became 
evident that no amount of bargaining with BASF was going to save 
the local from extinction. That is when OCAW decided the only 
option left was to institute its "corporate accountability campaign." 
OCAW decided to begin by bombarding the U.S.-based BASF 
Corp. with a sustained attack from as many sides as possible, to 
put it on the defensive and keep selected executives busy answer-
ing embarrassing questions, prompting them at one point to com-
plain bitterly and shrilly about the "scorched-earth campaign." 
Later, OCAW expanded the campaign to take on the company 
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worldwide. The union used a dizzying combination of legal 
attacks, dogged research, grassroots organizing and pressure, and 
creative public relations. 
The union boycotted BASF's consumer products such as audio 
tapes, antifreeze and vitamins; attacked the company for hazard-
ous waste dumping in four states; conducted a sit-in to "lock in" 
company executives at their New Jersey headquarters; crashed 
a company picnic; and disclosed a $60,000 interest-free, principal-
free "loan" from BASF to one of its top executives. 
One of the keys to the campaign was a treasure trove of internal 
company documents the union obtained, using means that were 
legal but secret. The union used the documents to disrupt the com-
pany's affairs by: using strategic business information to get the 
jump on BASF's future plans; mailing the documents to astounded 
customers and suppliers; revealing information on the company's 
computer system; publishing the formula for a proprietary anti-
freeze additive, and even returning documents anonymously to 
BASF officials just to let them know someone was watching. The 
union regularly put out a newsletter with numerous disclosures 
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of executive travel itineraries, personnel information, future expan-
sion and marketing plans, and other tidbits. 
As a national organizing tool, the union produced a 53-minute 
video on the locked-out workers and their community allies. The 
video detailed BASF's history of immoral practices—from its 
promotion of poison gas in World War I, and the conviction of 
BASF executives for Nazi war crimes in World War II, to its 
present-day union-busting and despoliation of Louisiana's environ-
ment. Locally, billboards in Ascension Parish proclaimed the area 
"Bhopal on the Bayou" and "Gateway to Cancer Alley." Demon-
strations, rallies, sit-ins, hundreds of newspaper articles, and 
various forms of direct lobbying of stockholders and corporate 
executives—all played a role. 
But despite the blitzkrieg maneuvers and fireworks, the union's 
real strength was that its leaders never forgot that its power came 
from individual workers, their families, relatives, friends, members 
of the community and other towns where citizens felt they were 
being trampled by BASF's practices. 
The international union instituted an Adopt-a-Family program 
that collected tens of thousands of dollars from OCAW locals 
around the country and, eventually, from other unions in the U.S. 
and abroad. Workers' wives formed a Women's Support Group 
that helped weather the financial and personal pressures and 
busied themselves with the details of work that needed to be done. 
They gathered regularly at the Prairieville Volunteer Firehouse 
to meet, swap stories, air problems, and to help determine where 
the union's Adopt-a-Family support was most needed. 
Many locked-out workers worked full time on the union's cam-
paign—administering union support activities, monitoring chem-
ical plant emissions, and personally reaching out to community 
friends and allies to build the local coalition. Many others 
contributed by digging out information from local libraries, con-
structing extensive mailing lists, and getting out newsletters and 
direct mail solicitations. 
At the base of the campaign, and all the coalitions and activities 
the union was able to build around it, was a strong local union 
with a dedicated leadership and an active and unified member-
ship. Only that kind of union can reach out and develop the kinds 
of long-term coalitions that were eventually aligned against BASF. 
The Environmental Coalition 
The most important of the union's farflung allies was Louisiana's 
grassroots environmentalist network, starting with environmental 
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activists in Ascension Parish and spreading out to national groups 
like Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the National Toxics 
Campaign. 
The union used the replacement of its trained workforce with 
poorly trained and inexperienced contract workers as a jumping-
off point for beginning a debate about the relationship between 
worker health and safety and the environment. 
With the help of those nettlesome internal company documents, 
the union demonstrated a pattern of safety problems at the plant 
following the lockout—a pattern so compelling that it eventually 
drew widespread attention when Rep. John Conyers (D-Michigan) 
launched a Congressional investigation. Later, in an attempt to 
institutionalize such concerns, OCAW helped launch Louisiana 
Workers Against Toxic Chemical Hazards (LA WATCH) to deal with 
workers' health concerns in the state's huge petrochemical 
workforce, which numbers about 28,000. LA WATCH, which 
teamed with Loyola University's Institute for Human Relations, 
offers a hot-line for workers in the industry and acts as a watchdog 
over a hamstrung Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
(OSHA). 
The union reasoned that if in-plant health and safety was 
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deteriorating, external pollution standards were likely declining 
as well. Union workers could challenge unsound health and safety 
and environmental practices without fear of losing their jobs. The 
contract workers had no such protection. 
This suspicion was confirmed by numerous accidental releases 
of hazardous chemicals from BASF during the lockout; major 
releases of phosgene, toluene and other toxic gases were well 
publicized in the local media. Further, locked-out workers, using 
special air-monitoring devices, began random tests of air quality 
in areas around BASF and other chemical plants. A study docu-
mented that over a one-year period, 196 million pounds of 
chemical pollutants had been released by the 18 Geismar-area 
chemical plants. A joint study by OCAW and the Sierra Club 
further documented that 76 million pounds of chemicals had been 
dumped into the Mississippi River by 15 area plants in one year. 
With the help of environmental activists, OCAW also docu-
mented and publicized some of the environmental and health 
consequences of all this chemical pollution: threatened wetlands, 
contaminated groundwater, an unusually high number of miscar-
riages in Ascension Parish, and one of the highest known cancer 
rates in the nation. 
Union activists concentrated on research and developed or hired 
technical expertise to challenge the scientific assertions of industry 
officials. The union helped form Ascension Parish Residents 
Against Toxic Pollution, which won two lawsuits against the state, 
BASF and other chemical companies. These suits established new 
precedents in environmental law and regulation. Aiding in the 
suits were the faculty and student attorneys at the Tulane 
University Environmental Law Clinic. 
One precedent was set when a court threw out as too small a 
$66,700 fine against BASF for five environmental violations. The 
court ordered a state agency to reassess the penalty by adding the 
savings the company had reaped by not installing proper pollu-
tion controls. The agency now routinely includes such economic 
benefits in its penalty calculations. The state's penalties have been 
noticeably higher since the decision and are levied and collected 
more aggressively. 
The union led the fight to establish another precedent when a 
court ordered the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) to comply with a legislative deadline to write new rules 
to restrict the underground injection of hazardous waste. The new 
rules, which are tougher than present federal EPA regulations, ban 
underground injection unless there is monitoring, proof of no 
migration, and no alternatives such as waste reduction. 
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BASF and other chemical companies discovered the terms of 
debate had shifted when the state denied construction permits 
for a $50-million facility because of groundwater contamination 
at the Geismar site. The decision led to a new state policy of pro-
hibiting such construction, which affected half a dozen other 
chemical plants. Another unit built on the same site at BASF 
received a temporary operating permit, but may have to be demol-
ished in order for contaminated soil to be excavated. 
The union helped environmentalists learn to fight on the 
industry's home turf, in the permit and regulatory bureaucracy 
where most of the major decisions are made long before the public 
finds out about them. The efforts helped open up the process to 
the public, with more open meetings and records, and educated 
the public about how to get their voices heard. It generated 
newspaper coverage of these previously ignored activities and 
aired some highly visible battles over permits for incinerators, 
landfills, injection wells and new plants, such as a proposed 
Aristech chemical venture that was opposed by local citizens and 
eventually put on hold. In many of these battles, the state attorney 
general's office was a potent legal ally. 
The OCAW was generous not only with its own local, but used 
its resources to get other efforts off the ground. The union funded 
some projects directly but was more valuable in linking up pro-
gressive foundations and other donors with Louisiana causes. The 
union helped raise $207,000, filling desperate needs of existing 
groups and helping to launch new ones. 
The union also took on the company in the heretofore obscure 
area of industrial inducement and economic development by 
challenging state and local tax breaks granted to BASF and others 
as a giveaway of public resources. The union argued that these 
tax breaks were especially vile because of their concentration in 
industries that create few jobs and most of the environmental 
stress. At one point, OCAW efforts forced BASF to ante up 
$225,000 in back taxes on a mothballed herbicide unit it hadn't 
bothered to tell anybody was shut down. 
The union broadened its attack on corporate tax giveaways by 
helping to found the Louisiana Citizens for Tax Justice, a research 
and public education project on state tax and industrial policy 
modeled on the labor-backed national Citizens for Tax Justice. This 
focus on tax breaks for polluters, aided by the Tblane Environ-
mental Law Clinic, recently prompted the governor of the most 
economically depressed state in the nation to say that, while jobs 
are important, some jobs are not wanted. 
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Taking the Campaign Global 
The OCAW forged international alliances during the lockout 
with BASF workers, citizen's groups and politicians in other coun-
tries. Delegations from the U.S. and West Germany visited their 
opposite numbers and staged demonstrations against pollution 
problems caused by BASF and others in both the Rhine and 
Mississippi Rivers. German Green Party members visited the U.S., 
as did Indian victims of the Bhopal industrial disaster. 
The union protested the company's actions at BASF stockholder 
meetings in Germany, to the International Labor Organization in 
Geneva, and to the European Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development. The union's disclosure of BASF computer 
shipments to South Africa led to their curtailment, and the loss 
of $47 million in business for the company. 
A workers' solidarity committee at BASF's headquarters plant 
in Ludwigshafen, Germany, took up gate collections, and orga-
nized rallies and publicity in support of the Geismar workers. The 
leader of the Solidarity Committee, Bernhard Doenig, was charged 
by BASF with having stolen a directory of home addresses and 
phone numbers of top BASF executives and with assisting the 
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union in writing the wives of the 1,000 most important executives 
of the German parent and distributing home address information 
to the general public. After a trial that lasted nearly a year, Doenig 
was cleared of all charges. 
Both financial and moral support also came from BASF union 
workers in Brazil, Belgium and France. 
The Settlement 
The three final acts that broke BASF's will were: the blocking 
of a massive hazardous waste incinerator-chemical dump project 
in Indiana; the halting of a $50-million expansion in Geismar; and 
efforts to block the company from acquiring state forestland in 
New Jersey at fire sale prices for a new corporate headquarters. 
In the end, the campaign even earned respect from an unnamed 
BASF executive who called it "very sophisticated and represen-
tative of a whole new ball game." Undoubtedly, BASF was feeling 
tremendous pressure that was continuing to build with no end 
in sight. 
Toward the end, the pressure was coming not only from unions 
and citizens, but from other companies. Many Louisiana com-
panies felt the German giant brought down trouble on the entire 
petrochemical industry with its stubborn lockout. One locked-out 
worker's wife, who is employed by a nearby chemical company, 
confided that her bosses were blaming stricter hazardous waste 
regulations on BASF. No doubt the chemical industry hopes the 
settlement will deflate the growing pressure for corporate and 
government accountability throughout Louisiana. 
While other unions have had mixed results with these cam-
paigns, OCAW's recent success can be credited to five important 
factors: the members' stamina and solidarity; the state's grassroots 
environmental network; brilliant, tireless leadership from a stable 
core; a motherlode of company documents, and unwavering 
support from the national union. 
The resolution of the labor dispute did not end the corporate 
accountability campaign, and activists in Louisiana are working 
to maintain the movement's momentum. OCAW officials said that 
although they would consider lifting the consumer-products 
boycott, the two sides did not discuss ending the campaign as part 
of the settlement. 
"We couldn't stop (it) now even if we wanted to," OCAW Inter-
national Representative Ernie Rousselle said. "(These issues) have 
a life of their own now and they are, in large part, issues over 
which we no longer have any ownership. We have an obligation 
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to ourselves and to those outside the labor movement to continue 
the process of coalition-building." 
Since the December 1989 settlement, Local 4-620, in coopera-
tion with the National Toxics Campaign, has jointly funded a 
project to carry forward the process of bridging the gap between 
chemical workers and communities over toxics issues. Larry 
Evans, formerly editor of The Millhunk Herald in the Pittsburgh 
area, has been recruited to replace Richard Miller, who for the 
last five years was funded by the OCAW as the campaign's lead 
organizer. As Miller declared, "We've got to carry forward the 
momentum around these organizing victories—around toxics, 
taxes and other social justice issues. What we've discovered is that 
our strength here comes more from coalitions with the community 
rather than from the labor movement. We're trying to institu-
tionalize these gains so that this local union will never again be 
left naked to a union-busting company." 
Like the Louisiana Citizens for Tax Justice project, which has 
moved successfully to reduce the industrial tax exemptions of the 
petrochemical industry, the net result is a cleaner environment, 
more money for vital public projects, more jobs, a broader political 
base, and a union that is stronger and more resistant to both union-
busting and environmental job blackmail. 
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Where to From Here? 
The OCAW campaign at BASF in Geismar challenged the tradi-
tional relationship of capital to workers in which the community 
pays a certain amount of social costs in order to gain needed jobs. 
As the damage has piled up in recent years, workers have become 
less willing to accept that trade-off, although many unions are still 
paralyzed by their dependence on industry. 
"They keep threatening us with the loss of our jobs," said John 
Daigle, the Geismar local union president, explaining the new 
attitude. "But we don't want those kinds of jobs anymore. We want 
clean jobs." 
Like Daigle, many workers and citizens in Louisiana will never 
again look at the state's huge petrochemical industry through the 
same eyes. After five years of publicity and debate about the 
environmental, health and social costs of an economy based on 
distant multinational oil and chemical producers, the industry is 
no longer the goose that laid the golden egg. 
The fight radicalized not only local labor leaders and member-
ship but many workers and citizens who observed it from a not-
so-safe distance. The evolution and growth of a broad-based 
campaign—which crossed racial lines and included activists from 
labor, environment, public housing, economic, religious and social 
justice groups—produced a wealth of strategies and ideas for com-
munity organizing and pressure-building against corporate 
interests. 
The campaign against BASF, for example, has provided fertile 
ground for yet another coalition effort—this time on the issue of 
catastrophic petrochemical plant fires, explosions and releases. 
Exhaustive analysis linking the use of temporary labor to increases 
in accidents, injuries and chemical releases at Geismar provided 
the framework for a nationwide campaign against the slipshod 
maintenance practices of the entire petrochemical industry. 
In June 1990 the OCAW released Out of Control, a video 
documentary produced in conjunction with Ralph Nader. The film 
incorporates interviews with plant workers and industry experts 
from across the United States and documents the causes of 
chemical catastrophes and their effects on workers, communities 
and the environment. "During the last few years," says OCAW 
Vice President Robert E. Wages, "we've seen more fires, more 
explosions, and more death on the job. Our members are basically 
saying that life in these plants is like the streets of Laredo. They're 
fed up.'' The video, along with an action plan and discussion guide, 
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has been widely distributed to locals and communities across the 
country. 
Wages, who has overall responsibility for negotiating with the 
petrochemical industry and for the OCAW's corporate campaign 
activities, described the film as part of a nationwide grassroots 
effort "to build bridges between labor and community strong 
enough to bear the weight of a sweeping program of reform at 
local, state and national levels." 
"Basically," says Wages, "we're capitalizing on our experiences 
in Geismar and elsewhere and institutionalizing them on a national 
level." Wages believes that if unions are to be relevant, they must 
be prepared to offer something to the community that the com-
panies are unwilling or incapable of offering. "You can't do this 
by donating to the United Way or sponsoring Little League teams. 
It's a powerful win/win agenda for job security, worker health, 
public safety and environmental protection." 
This attitude is backstopped by members like BASF worker 
Leslie Vann, who believes his local set a new standard for the labor 
movement. "I think we have set an example for the labor move-
ment in the 1990s," said Vann during the January victory party. 
"I think a lot of organizing in the 1990s will take inspiration from 
this struggle. We didn't get any help from the NLRB or the courts. 
We had to do it by ourselves and with our friends. And we haven't 
forgotten our friends." • 
